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Feely: A Survey Of Recent Developments In The Law: Civil Procedure

m.
A.

CIVIL PROCEDURE

RemovalJurisdiction

When a case consists of a claim that includes both issues of
federal and state law, removal of the claim is authorized under a
theory of supplemental jurisdiction.' The United States Supreme
Court, in Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht,2 found a significant difference between the former situation and a case that involved a federal claim intertwined with a claim of an Eleventh
Amendment3 bar.4 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that
"presence in an otherwise removable case of an Eleventh Amendment-barred claim does not destroy removal jurisdiction that would
otherwise exist and a federal court may proceed to hear non-barred
claims."5
The Wisconsin Department of Corrections dismissed prison
guard Keith Schacht for stealing items from a state prison. 6 In response, Schacht filed a complaint in state court against the Department and several employees (in both a personal and official
capacity) alleging a violation of Schacht's civil rights
The Department's answer, filed in federal court, raised a defense that the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, including
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, barred the section 1983 claim
against the state and its employees in their official capacity.' The
federal district court granted the individual defendants' summary
judgment on the claims against the individuals in their personal

1. See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2051
(1998), abrogating FrancesJ. v. Wright, 19 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 1994).
2. 118 S. Ct. 2047 (1998).
3.

See U.S. CONST. amend XI.

4. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2051.
5. Id. at 2047.
6. See id. at 2050.
7. See id. Specifically, the complaint alleged in several different claims that
the Department and its employees had deprived Schacht of liberty and property
without due process of law, thereby violating the U.S. Constitution and civil rights
laws. See id
8. See id
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capacity. The court held that even if Schacht's allegations were
true, his dismissal did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. ° The court also granted the Department's
motion to dismiss the claims against the state."
On appeal, Schacht only disputed the district court's holding
on the personal capacity claims. During the appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered the permissibility of
removal from state to federal court. 3 The court held that removal
to federal court had beeh improper because the federal courts
lacked of jurisdiction over Schacht's case.14 The presence of even
one claim subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar will deprive the
federal court ofjurisdiction over the entire case.15
The Supreme Court did not agree with the Seventh Circuit. 16
7
The Supreme Court noted that the federal removal statute s1 governing provision authorizes removal of any action where (1) the
federal district courts have original jurisdiction, and (2) the action
is brought in a state court. 1 Federal statutes do not, however, address situations subject to an Eleventh Amendment bar.' 9
Schacht presented a multi-part argument in support of destroying removal jurisdiction where a federal claim is subject to an
Eleventh Amendment bar.20 First, Schacht distinguished cases containing both federal law and state law claims from cases containing
a federal claim with an Eleventh Amendment bar.2 The court of

9. See id.
10. See id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2050. The court noted that Schacht agreed that
claims for money damages were barred by the Eleventh Amendment but wanted to
pursue a claim for injunctive relief. See id. However, Schacht's complaint did not
request injunctive relief; thus, the complaint was dismissed. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.; see also Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 116 F.3d 1151,
1153 (7th Cir. 1997).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 2051. The court of appeals asserted that the Eleventh Amendment had been interpreted by their court as prohibiting assertion of an Eleventh
Amendment bar in federal court. See id.
16. See id.
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994).
18. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2051. Section 1331 grants federal courts "original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994).
19. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at2051.
20. See id.
21. See id. The court acknowledged that they have previously suggested that
the inclusion of even one claim arising under federal law is sufficient for original
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appeals agreed with that distinction, noting that in the former
cases, supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1367(a)
extends to cover the state law claims. 22 In the latter cases, supple23
mental jurisdiction is not extended to the claims.
Instead, the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits the court from hearing and deciding the claim.24
The second part of Schacht's argument focused on the jurisdictional character of the difference between the claims.25 The
court of appeals found a difference, stating that neither section
1367 nor any other law permits supplemental jurisdiction in cases
26
with federal claims and an Eleventh Amendment bar; these cases
are on a different footing than those that are not independently
removable. 27 The Supreme Court responded to this2 sargument, in
part, within the analysis of Schacht's third argument.
Third, Schacht applied an analogy to removal based on diversityjurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1332.29 As long as there is a
claim against a non-diverse defendant, a diverse defendant can not
remove a case to federal court. Schacht argued that because the
jurisdictional problem here was just as serious as in diversity situations, the presence of one claim should destroy removal jurisdic31
tion in the same manner as in diversity cases.

jurisdiction. See id. However, that statement appears only in the context of cases
involving both state law claims and federal law claims. See id.
22. See id. Section 1367 (a) states:
[I] n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction,
the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case of controversy ....
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994).
23. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2052.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. The Seventh Circuit went on to explain that this difference is due
to the affirmative limitation which the doctrine of sovereign immunity imposed on
jurisdiction. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id. Section 1332 (a) (1) provides original jurisdiction where the controversy exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of a different state. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1998).
30. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2052; see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61,
68-69 (1996).
31. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2052.
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The Supreme Court was not convinced by Schacht's analogy
and observed that in diversity cases where a non-diverse party is
present, jurisdiction is automatically destroyed. Further, it cannot
be consented to or waived and cannot be ignored by the court.3 3 In
contrast, the Eleventh Amendment does not automatically destroy
jurisdiction, rather, it grants the State power to assert or waive the
defense of sovereign
immunity.4 Additionally,
the. court .is not re..
35
quired to raise the defect sua sponte. Other conditions, includin
timing of removal jurisdiction, further undermine the analogy.
These differences support different treatment for original jurisdiction purposes and destroy the proposed analogy.37 Thus, if Schacht
had originally filed his claim in federal court, that court would have
had original jurisdiction, and Schacht would be allowed to remove
to federal court.m
Finally, the Court rejected Schacht's last argument, which alleged that after the state asserted the Eleventh Amendment defense, the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and
should have remanded under 28 U.S.C. section 1447(c).3 9 The
Court stated that an ordinary reading of the statute shows that it refers to situations where the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over a case, not over one claim within a case. In addition, the statute's objective, to provide procedural guidance after removal, is ir-

32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 2053. Removal jurisdiction should be reviewed by looking at the
status of the case at the time the complaint was filed, which is prior to defendant's
answer. See id. Thus, the underlying relevant condition could not exist prior to
removal because the state must assert the Eleventh Amendment bar as a defense in
their answer. See id. As of the time of the filing, a case involving incomplete diversity would have been outside the jurisdiction of the federal court. See id.
37. See id. at 2053. The court further stated that in cases of diversity jurisdiction, original jurisdiction is destroyed by one claim against a non-diverse party. See
id. However, with subject matter jurisdictional issues, the Court has previously assumed that the potential of an Eleventh Amendment bar over one claim will not
destroy jurisdiction over the entire case. See id. The Court further stated that this
case is more analogous to cases in which diversity is destroyed by a later event
(e.g., change in citizenship of a party). See id. "In such cases a federal court will
keep a removed case." Id.
38. See id. at 2053.
39. See id. at 2054. Section 1447 (c) provides "[i]f at any time before final
judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case
shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (1994) (emphasis added).
40. See Schacht, 118 S. Ct. at 2054.
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relevant to the problem presented here.'
B. Rule 68-Offers ofJudgment or Settlement
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently resolved a conflict between Minnesota Statutes section 549 and Rule 68 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Specifically, the court held that if a
plaintiff rejects a Rule 68 settlement offer from a defendant that is
ultimately more favorable than the judgment, the plaintiff is not
denied costs and disbursements allowable under section 549.43
Amy Borchert ("Borchert") sued Larry Maloney ("Maloney")
for damages from injuries she sustained as an automobile passenger when Maloney's vehicle collided with hers." Borchert rejected
Maloney's $10,000 settlement offer made pursuant to Rule 68. 45 At
trial, the jury awarded Borchert $11,651 in damages, attributing
sixty percent of the award to Maloney's negligence and forty percent to the driver of the car Borchert was riding in." After a reduction for comparative negligence and collateral source offsets, Borchert received a final damage award of $4,502.40, plus costs and
disbursements.47 In addition, the trial court ordered Borchert to
pay Maloney's costs and disbursements since the net judgment was
less than the Rule 68 settlement offer. 48
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that "[w]here a plaintiff rejects a Rule 68 offer of settlement by
a defendant and [ultimately] receives a judgment less favorable
than the [Rule 68] offer, the plaintiff is denied costs and disbursements."49
The Minnesota Supreme Court disagreed and upheld the
holding ofg.51
the trial court.50
" Before beginningg2its analysis, the court
defined the conflict. Under Rule 68, when a settlement offer is
41.

See id. The statute section differentiates between removals due to lack of

subject matter jurisdiction and removal for other reasons (e.g., the removal took
place after expiration of pertinent time limits). See id.
42. See Borchert v. Maloney, 581 N.W.2d 838, 839 (Minn. 1998).
43. See id at 840.
44. See id. at 839.
45. See id.; see also MINN. R. CIv. P. 68 (1998).
46. See Borchert, 581 N.W.2d at 839. Borchert was a passenger in the vehicle of
an uninsured motorist. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.

49.

Id.

50.
51.

See id. at 840.
See id. at 839.
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rejected, the offeree must pay the offeror's costs when the judgment is less favorable than the settlement offer. 53 Conversely, under the statute, a prevailing party is entitled to recover his or her
costs. 54

The
court first
determined the identity of the prevailing
55
..
party. The prevailing party is the party who receives the favorable
56
decision or verdict. The fact that the judgment against Maloney
was more favorable than the Rule 68 settlement offer indicates that
Maloney was partially successful.5 7 Yet, Borchert prevailed on the
58
merits and received a verdict and judgment in her favor. Thus,
the court held that it was clear that Borchert was the prevailing
party.59
The court next analyzed whether •Rule 68 precluded
Borchert
60
from recovering her costs and disbursements.
The court acknowledged the district court's finding that Rule 68 does not specifically• include a requirement
that the offeree pay for her own
61
disbursements and costs. To give effect to both the statute and
the rule, the court agreed with the district court and held that Borchert was entitled to recover her costs and disbursements under the

52. See MiNN. R. Civ. P. 68 ("If the judgment finally entered is not more favorable to the offeree than the offer, the offeree must pay the offeror's costs and
disbursements.").
53. See Borchert, 581 N.W.2d at 839.
54. See id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 549.02 (1998) (providing that costs shall be
allowed upon ajudgment in the plaintiff's favor of $100 or more in an action only
for the recovery of money); MINN. STAT. § 549.04 (1998) (providing that in every
district court action, the prevailing party shall be allowed reasonable disbursements paid or incurred).
55. See Borchert, 581 N.W.2d at 839. Borchert argued that she was the prevailing party. See id. Her reasoning stemmed from the jury finding that Maloney was
negligent and that Borchert sustained damages as a result of the negligence. See
id. Conversely, Maloney argued that Borchert was not the prevailing party because
the rejection of the settlement offer was the equivalent of a claim that her damages exceeded $10,000. See id. at 840. Consequently, Maloney asserted that she
was required to obtain ajudgment in excess of $10,000. See id. at 839-40.
56. See id. at 840. In determining who qualified as the prevailing party, the
court considered the general result and inquired into who had succeeded in the
action in view of the law. See id.
57. See id. 581 N.W.2d at 840.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id. Maloney argued that allowing Borchert to recover her costs would
be contrary to public policy and the purpose of Rule 68 because the purpose of
Rule 68 is to promote settlements. See id.
61. See id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss3/8

6

Feely: A Survey Of Recent
Developments
In The Law: Civil Procedure
CJVIL
PROCEDURE

1999l

1059

62

statute. The court stated, "[i]f the rule was intended to prevent
an offeree who prevails on the lawsuit's merits from recovering her
costs and disbursements even though the judgment entered was
less than the Rule 68 offer, it would specifically say so, as does
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 68. ",63 The federal rule states that
the offeree is responsible for all costs incurred after the presentation of the settlement offer. 64
The court further reasoned that a holding that Borchert was
entitled to recover her reasonable costs and disbursements was not
inconsistent with the purpose of Rule 68. 6' Rule 68 encourages settlement of lawsuits. 66 Even if, in the end, the offeree may recover
her own costs, the effect of paying the offeror's
costs is still a power6
ful incentive for reaching a settlement. 1
C. Intervention

The federal circuit courts have differing views on whether
standing under Article III is required in cases of intervention.69
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified its position on the issue in PlannedParenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc. v.

Ehlmann' ° The court denied intervention of ten legislators due to
71
a lack of standing.
The legislators' efforts to obtain standing stemmed from the
Missouri Attorney General's unsuccessful efforts to sustain family
planning funding legislation that excluded Planned Parenthood
from receiving funds. The Missouri Legislature annually enacted
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. See id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 68 (providing in relevant part: "[I]f the
judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable to the offeree than
the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer.").
65. See Borchert, 581 N.W.2d at 840-41.
66. See id. at 840. The court acknowledged that the advisory committee notes
stated that "[the] principal effect of making an offer of settlement under Rule 68
is to shift the burden of paying costs properly taxable under Minn. R. Civ. P.
54.04." See id. (citing MINN. R. CIv. P. 68, advisory committee's note c (1985)).
However, the court rejected the notes stating that, while helpful, the notes are not
binding on the court. See id.
67. See id. at 841.
68. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
69. See Planned Parenthood of Mid-Mo. and E. Kan., Inc. v. Ehlmann, 137
F.3d 573, 577 (8th Cir. 1998).
70. 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998)
71. See id. at 575.
72. See id.
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a program where the Department of Health ("Department")
funded family planning services for low-income people.73 Before
1995, the program did not prevent entities that performed abortions from participating, but restrained them from using the funds
to promote or perform abortions. In 1995, a bill was enacted by
the Missouri Legislature that expressly limited these funds. 75 The
Department interpreted the language of the bill to exclude
Planned Parenthood because it performed abortion services.76
On May 23, 1996, Planned Parenthood, seeking an injunction,
charged that the statute was unconstitutional. The district court
granted the motions for preliminary and permanent injunctions
with an amended order on June 27, 1996.78 The order enjoined the
Department from: (1) excluding Planned Parenthood from the
funds; (2) precluding submission by Planned Parenthood of proposals for funds; and (3) using different criteria to evaluate
Planned Parenthood's proposals. 79 The Department, represented
by the Missouri Attorney General, did not appeal. s°
On May 17, 1996, the Missouri Legislature reenacted verbatim
the language of the 1995 bill for the 1996 fiscal year.' The Department followed the amended order of the court and allowed
Planned Parenthood to participate in the program.82
In 1997, the Missouri Legislature enacted a three tiered system, via House Bill 20 ("H.B. 20"), for appropriating funds for family planning services to the Department.83 The first tier provided
that "the Department could pay or grant family planning funds to
public, quasi-public and private family planning organizations that
did not provide or promote abortions."84 If a court declared the
first tier unconstitutional, then the Department could implement

73.
74.
75.
76.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. Planned Parenthood provides medical and family planning serv-

ices to 26 Missouri counties. See id. Abortions are performed at two of the nine
Missouri clinics. See id. Additionally, Planned Parenthood supports preserving le-

gal and safe abortion services. See id.
77.

See id.

78.

See id,

79.
80.

See id.
See id

81.
82.

See id.
See id. at 575-76.

83.
84.

See id. at 576.
Id.
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the second tier.8 5 The second tier omitted funding to private organizations but kept in the provision that the funds could be appropriated to public or quasi-public organizations that did not provide abortion services. 6 In the event the second tier was declared
unconstitutional, the third tier provided that the funds would only
be appropriated to public organizations.
The Governor had the option to line item veto H.B. 20 or to
sign it as enacted M Although he had expressed opposition to a
scheme that would exclude Planned Parenthood, he signed the bill
into law on June 26, 1997.89 He then directed the Attorney General
to seek clarification from the district court about the applicability
of the 1996 injunction. 9° The Attorney General filed a motion to
clarify on June 27, 1997, which stated that the Department desired
to comply with the permanent injunction.9' On June 30, 1997, via
telephonic conference, the district court heard arguments. 92 That
same day, the district court proclaimed that H.B. 20 was unconstitutional.3 The Attorney General did not appeal the ruling.94
On July 25, 1997, ten Missouri senators and representatives
who voted for H.B. 20 sought intervention to assist the Department
in defending the constitutionality of H.B. 20. 9' The motion sought
a right to intervene under section 24(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, or for leave to intervene under 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9 6 The Attorney General did not op85.
86.

See id
See id.

87.
88.
89.
90.

See i&
See id,
See id.
See id,

91. See id. The legislators contend that the Attorney General did not defend
the constitutionality of H.B. 20 and that he did not "attempt to explain the severability of the three-tiered system." Id.

92. See id.
93. See id
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (a) states, in part, that anyone will be permitted
to intervene when: (1) a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene or (2)
when the applicant claims an interest relation to the transaction and the disposition of the action may impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect their interest, unless the matter is adequately represented by existing parties. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 24 (a). Rule 24(b) states, in part, that anyone may be permitted to inter-

vene when: (1) a statute confers the right or (2) when an applicant's claim and the
main action have a common question of law or fact. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) The
court should consider whether the intervention will unduly prejudice or delay the
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999
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pose the motion. However, Planned Parenthood filed a motion in
opposition to the legislators' motion to intervene.98 The district
court denied the motion to intervene, stating that the "legislators
did not have the requisite Article III standing to litigate claims." 99
The court recognized its previous decision in Mausoif v. BabbiOO and held "that the Constitution requires that prospective intervenors have Article III standing to litigate their claims in Federal
Court."1' ' Thus, an intervenor must both possess standing and satisfy the requirements of Rule 24.102 The court disagreed with the
legislators' claim that they possessed standing as legislators and citi103
zens.
The legislators first cited Coleman v. Miller1 4 to support their

claim of standing as legislators for an institutional injury.' ° In
Coleman, the Supreme Court held that twenty state legislators had
standing to challenge whether the State Lieutenant Governor had
the authority to cast the deciding vote in favor of an amendment to
the constitution involving child labor. 0 6 The Supreme Court concluded that because the legislators had voted against the amendment, they had a "plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes." 1 7 The legislators here argued
that their votes were nullified both by the Missouri Executive
adjudication of the rights of the original parties. See id.
97. See Ehlmann, 137 F.3d at 576.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 576.
100. 85 F.3d 1295 (8th Cir. 1996).
101. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d at 576 (quoting Mausolfi 85 F.3d at 1300).
102. See Ehlmann, 137 F.3d at 577. The legislators contended that they should
have been allowed to intervene because they satisfied the four factors required for
intervention under Rule 24 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. at
576-77. "To intervene as of right, an applicant must (1) have a recognized interest
in the subject matter of the litigation that (2) might be impaired by the disposition
of the case and that (3) will not be adequately protected by the existing parties."
Mausolf,85 F.3d at 1299.
103. See Ehlmann, 137 F.3d at 577. Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution,
the party seeking standing must have suffered an concrete and particularized "injury in fact" that is actual or imminent and that is "an invasion of a legally protect
interest." Id. The injury must be casually connected to the conduct which must be
"fairly traceable to the challenged action," and it must be likely, not speculative,
that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Id. (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
104. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
105. See Ehlmann, 137 F.3d at 577; see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 441
(1939).
106. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 444.
107. See id. at 448.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss3/8

10

1999]

Feely: A Survey Of Recent
Developments
In The Law: Civil Procedure
CIVIL
PROCEDURE

1063

Branch when they sought to clarify the legislation and by the Attorney General's collaboration with Planned
Parenthood to reverse
• •
108
the ruling that H.B. 20 was unconstitutional.
Next, the legislators tried to distinguish a recent Supreme
Court decision relied on by the district court, Raines v. Byrd.'0 9 In
Raines, the Supreme Court limited the scope of Coleman stating that
the holding "stands (at most...) for the proposition that the legislators whose vote would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a
specific legislative act have standing to sue if that legislative action
goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that
their votes have been completely nullified." 10 The Supreme Court
went on to state that the Congressmen's claim did not fall within
Coleman because "they have not alleged that they voted for a specific bill, that there was sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the
bill was nonetheless defeated.""'
In the present case, the Eighth Circuit concluded that, under
both the Raines and Coleman decisions, the legislators' votes were
not nullified by the Missouri executive branch."2 There was not
nullification in the Coleman sense "that a bill [the legislators] voted
for would have become law if their vote had not been stripped of its
validity.. . .,"3 Further, the court stated that there was no interfer14
ence in the legislative process by the Missouri executive branch.
The complaint merely
concerned a disagreement over litigation
5
strategy decisions."

108. See id. at 577. The legislators' specific claims contended that the Attorney
General colluded with Planned Parenthood by "not arguing the constitutionality
of H.B. 20 under Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), by not opposing Planned
Parenthood's evidence presented in opposition to the motion to clarify, and by
agreeing to allow Planned Parenthood to submit additional evidence." Id.
109. See id.; see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). In Raines, six members
of Congress filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act.
See 521 U.S. at 819. The six congressmen had voted against the Line Item Veto Act
and contended that because the President could veto measures after signing them
into law, the effect of their votes were altered. See id.
110. Raines, 521 U.S. at 818-19.
111. Id.
112. See Ehlmann, 137 F.3d at 578.
113. Id.
114. See id. The court noted that the legislature passed H.B. 20, which the
Governor subsequently signed, to enforce the restrictions of the statute and to
seek clarification of the injunction to secure that his administration did not act in
contempt of court. See id.
115. See id.; see also Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 952
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (distinguishing between a distortion of the legislative process and
general grievances about governmental conduct).
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Additionally, the court stated that Coleman did not hold that
legislators who voted for an act could intervene when a court declares an act by the state legislature to be unconstitutional." 6
Rather, it related to a question of standing for legislators where
they contended their votes were nullified by an allegedly illegal action by the Lieutenant Governor." 7
Finally, the legislators contended that they had standing pursuant to a Missouri Statute."' The statute allowed Missouri taxpayers standing to enforce the provisions of laws "prohibiting the use
of public funds to perform, assist or encourage an abortion not
necessary to save the mother's life."" 9 The legislators claimed
standing to "defend the constitutionality of an appropriations bill
that was passed in compliance with the state's asserted interest as
expressed by the above statute. '
The court recognized that when authorized by state law, legislators may acquire standing to advocate the constitutionality of a
legislative statute.121 However, the court rejected the legislators' argument that the statute applied because the argument distorted
the statute's clear meaning "of granting taxpayer standing to enforce in state court prohibitions against funding abortion-related
activities with public funds."1

Sue Roemer Feely

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Ehlmann, 137 F.3d at 578.
See id.
See id,
Id. (quoting Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.220 (1997)).
Id.
See id.
Id.
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